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Abstract
References to the second demographic transition (SDT) concept/theoretical framework have 
increased dramatically in the last two decades. The SDT predicts unilinear change toward very low 
fertility and a diversity of union and family types. The primary driver of these changes is a 
powerful, inevitable and irreversible shift in attitudes and norms in the direction of greater 
individual freedom and self-actualization. First, we describe the origin of this framework and its 
evolution over time. Second, we review the empirical fit of the framework to major changes in 
demographic and family behavior in the U.S., the West, and beyond. As has been the case for other 
unilinear, developmental theories of demographic/family change, the SDT failed to predict many 
contemporary patterns of change/difference. Finally, we review previous critiques and identify 
fundamental weaknesses of this perspective, and provide brief comparisons to selected alternative 
approaches.
Keywords
Demographic change; ideational change; family; fertility; marriage; cohabitation
I. INTRODUCTION
The demographic transition, i.e., the transition from high to low death and birth rates, 
absorbed demographers’ attention for much of the second half of the 20th Century. This 
empirical and theoretical attention produced an impressive set of mechanisms that together 
provide a compelling explanation for the decline in vital rates (see Casterline 2003; 
Bongaarts and Watkins 1996). However, for understanding fertility changes within already 
low-fertility populations, the demographic transition literature offers little. Building on and 
against this classical tradition, the framework of a “second demographic transition” (SDT) 
has become a population researcher’s “go-to” concept/theoretical framework for studying 
family/fertility change in contemporary Europe as well as the Western world more broadly 
(see for example Bianchi 2014; Sobotka 2008; McLanahan 2004). It is now also being 
proposed for understanding family change in Asian and Latin American countries (Esteve et 
al 2012; Esteve et al 2012b; McDonald 2009; Atoh et al 2004).
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The second demographic transition entails “sustained sub-replacement fertility, a multitude 
of living arrangements other than marriage, the disconnection between marriage and 
procreation, and no stationary population” (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2008, pp.82; Lesthaeghe 
2010, pp. 211; Lesthaeghe 2014, pp 18112). The primary driver of these trends is the 
cultural shift toward postmodern attitudes and norms (i.e., those stressing individuality and 
self-actualization) (van de Kaa 2001). At the macro level the SDT provides a view of how 
societies evolve over time, stressing the role of ideational change in bringing about a 
package of demographic/family behaviors. At the individual level, the SDT framework 
offers individuals’ value orientations as the principal determinants of persons’ fertility and 
family behavior.
Originally proposed in 1986 by two European demographers, Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van 
de Kaa, the SDT framework/theory/concept (used in multiple ways in the literature) gained 
considerable traction in the 1990s (Billari and Liefbroer 2004). By the turn of the century it 
had become “the theory of the decade…that launched a thousand research projects” 
(Coleman 2004, pp. 11). Figure 1 (right axis) shows the increase in peer-reviewed articles in 
the social science journals that mention “second demographic transition” in their text. 
Google Scholar data (left axis), that includes books and reports, provide many more citations 
and shows a similar, dramatic, upward climb.
This review’s next section focuses on the content and scope of the SDT, and how they have 
evolved over time. The subsequent section assesses the fit of empirical evidence with the 
SDT. The final section reviews criticisms aimed at the SDT and briefly discusses some 
alternative approaches. We conclude with an appraisal that raises concerns about this widely 
used perspective. Specifically, the SDT clings to a problematic developmental perspective 
and as an inevitable result is inconsistent with important features of family and fertility in 
developed country contexts.
II. THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
A. Original statements
Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa coined the term ‘second transition’ in 1986; the phrase appeared 
in the title of the introductory chapter of a special volume (published in Dutch) on the 
demographic situation in low fertility countries (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986). Initially, 
Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa offered the second transition as a possible phenomenon (SDT 
was followed by a question mark in the title of the chapter). A year later, the Population 
Reference Bureau commissioned van de Kaa to write a bulletin on the demographic situation 
in Europe and van de Kaa titled this piece Europe’s Second Demographic Transition (van de 
Kaa 1987). This bulletin became the seminal and most cited work on SDT; according to 
Google (accessed on 7.21.16) it has been cited 2270 times.
Examining demographic change in 30 European countries, van de Kaa (1987, pp.5) argued 
that “the principal demographic feature of this second transition is the decline in fertility 
from somewhat above the ‘replacement’ level of 2.1 births per woman…to a level well 
below replacement.” The driving force behind this transition was ideational change -- a 
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dramatic shift from altruistic to individualistic norms and attitudes (van de Kaa, 1987, pp. 5; 
van de Kaa 2002, pp.5)
According to van de Kaa (1987), the second demographic transition began in Europe after 
World War II. He argued that the war led to an increase in premarital intercourse and the age 
at first sexual intercourse declined in the postwar period. However, social attitudes were 
slower to change and marriage was still required for legitimacy and acceptability of sexual 
relations. As a result the age at marriage declined during this period. The improvement in 
socio-economic conditions after the war made children more affordable and thus fertility 
rates also increased up until the 1960s (pp.10).
Van de Kaa (1987, pp. 10–11) proposed that early marriages loosened the temporal link 
between marriage and childbearing, as young married couples waited to have children until 
they were financially ready. Advances in contraceptive technology, with the introduction of 
the pill and IUD, further weakened the link between the two. The rise in divorce and 
separation along with the decoupling of sexual relationships and procreation led to a decline 
in marriage rates and an increase in cohabitation. After initially persisting, the pressure to 
marry by the time of first birth gave way as well (i.e., nonmarital fertility rose). Marriage 
(and consensual unions) no longer primarily reflected the desire for children and fertility 
rates declined well below replacement levels.
This is the “standard” sequence of events during the SDT (van de Kaa 1987, pp.11). van de 
Kaa (1987) acknowledged that changes in family formation in all 30 countries would not 
evolve according to this ‘standard’ sequence, but they would all experience the four basic 
features of the transition to below replacement fertility, and could be grouped according to 
where they were in the sequence (see Table 1, column 1). Three of these features were 
related to changes in family formation and structure, and one captures the shift in 
contraceptive use (from preventive to self-fulfilling). Van de Kaa (1987, pp.9) argued that 
while the timing and speed of the sequence of this second transition could differ 
substantially, there was still evidence of “logical ordering”.
Lesthaeghe’s (1995) chapter “The Second Demographic Transition in Western Countries: 
An Interpretation”, which is the second most cited work on the SDT, with 1188 citations 
(Google scholar as of 07.21.16), built on van de Kaa’s description by further codifying the 
features of SDT and their sequence into three phases (see Table 1, column 2). In a more 
recent statement, Lesthaeghe (2010, cited 547 times, Google Scholar 8/1/2016) elaborates 
the SDT in response to conflicting empirical evidence and a set of criticisms by his peers. 
We return to this evidence and criticism below, but Lesthaeghe (2010) acknowledged 
different rates of social and demographic change and some variation in developmental paths. 
He also allowed for some heterogeneity in the end stage. However, he does so without 
removing the SDT’s fundamental developmental character – a feature we critique in our 
concluding appraisal.
B. The (first) demographic transition
For some readers, a discussion of the second demographic transition (SDT) begs for a 
description of, and links to, the first. As noted at the outset, the (first) demographic transition 
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(DT) refers to the decline of fertility and mortality from high levels to low levels, with an 
intervening period of rapid population growth caused by an earlier and more rapid decline in 
mortality (than fertility). According to early statements of the demographic transition theory, 
the driver of these changes was industrialization (and associated social and economic 
development, i.e., modernization) that both increased children’s likelihood of survival and 
increased their cost to parents. These changes, in turn, increased motivation for reduced 
family size but did not undermine the universal expectation of marriage and parenthood. 
This description of change was based on patterns in the West but the scope of the theory was 
assumed to be global. Demographers posited that this demographic transition was inevitable, 
unilinear and irreversible (Casterline 2003).
The massive, two-decade long European Fertility Project (Coale and Watkins 1986) assessed 
the fit of European historical data to this theory. While not discrediting the distal influences 
of industrialization, on a decadal time scale the fertility decline took on a pattern best 
described as “social contagion”, a change driven by new ideas and new options as opposed 
to individual decision-makers changing assessment of the “costs” of children (Cleland and 
Wilson 1987). In other words, the decline of fertility in Europe showed a pattern suggesting 
“contagion” or “diffusion” – the best predictor of fertility decline for European provinces 
was the fertility behavior of neighboring provinces – rather than structural changes.
Lesthaeghe contributed greatly to the European fertility project through his early empirical 
work, The Decline of Belgian fertility, 1800–1970 (Lesthaeghe 1977), and his analyses of 
the European Project’s multi-nation provincial data (Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986). He 
argued that new modes of thinking were fundamental to the speed and timing of fertility 
decline. These new modes of thinking involved the social acceptability and multiple 
advantages of controlling fertility. Subsequent fertility declines among developing countries 
in the post WWII period were of similar character (see Cleland and Wilson 1987; Bongaarts 
and Watkins 1996). The role of new ideas legitimating small family size and family planning 
are now central to the DT.
Why is the second demographic transition (SDT) not just a continuation of the first? Given 
the findings of the European Fertility Project on the role of “new modes of thinking” one 
possible narrative would stress continuity in the mechanisms producing change. But instead 
the proponents of SDT argue that the focal phenomenon changed – it was no longer smaller 
family size; it became fertility postponement and increased voluntary childlessness 
(Lesthaeghe 2010, pp. 216; van de Kaa 2001, pp.302; van de Kaa 2002, pp.10). The 
watershed between the first and the second demographic transitions is the shift in norms, 
from altruistic to individualistic (van de Kaa 2002, pp.5; Lesthaeghe 1995, pp.19*; 
Lesthaeghe 2014, pp.18112). New motivations underlying family formation behavior 
distinguished the second transition from the first. Greater female emancipation and 
individual autonomy were more central to SDT than they were to the first transition 
(Lesthaeghe 1995 pp.18).
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C. Theoretical motivations
Van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe mention three arguments that convinced them that the SDT was 
truly different from the DT, a discontinuity anchored in an irreversible shift in motivation 
and sentiment. We discuss these in turn.
Shift from king-child to king-couple—Van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe were heavily 
influenced by Aries’ claim that motivational shifts lead to fertility decline in the West over 
the twentieth century (Aries 1980). Aries argued that even if the phenomenon of fertility 
decline experienced by the western world during the 1960s was not new, as pointed out by 
historians, the motivations behind it were; the resumption of fertility decline in the post-war 
period reflected a different outlook on life. To explain, Aries pointed out that “society has 
always controlled nature and domesticated sexuality” (1980 pp. 646). As early as the 16th 
century, Europeans practiced fertility control in the form of delayed marriages. Malthus 
(1888) captured this view by claiming that the “passion between the sexes” was too great for 
married couples to practice fertility control via abstinence (and Malthus viewed other means 
as immoral). People did not think to control the frequency of intercourse to influence 
pregnancy; “automatic unplanned behavior” and surrender to impulses/destiny was the 
norm. Consistent with this Malthusian claim, marriage timing was the only mechanism of 
fertility control available (Aries 1980, pp.646).
Change occurred when couples began to plan their families using foresight and organization. 
For Aries (1980, pp.646), this “revolution in sensibility” was perhaps as important as the 
French or Industrial Revolutions. He argued that this “planned parenthood” occurred before 
the availability of modern contraceptive technology, it relied on behavioral and sex-proximal 
methods (especially withdrawal and abstinence), and was in part successful because of a 
culture of self-control or non-coital, premarital eroticism.
Aries (1980) claimed that this is when affection became centered on children and the family, 
and families became more inward looking, organizing themselves in terms of children and 
their futures (note that he does not explain why this change took place). This led to a child-
oriented society and to greater investment in children; these changes encouraged small 
families. During this period, birth control and lower fertility were the consequence of 
wanting one’s children to be upwardly mobile.
In response to the persistence of the child’s status as “king” during the Baby Boom period of 
rising fertility, Aries argued that younger women began to revolt against the burdens of 
motherhood. This was aided by the revolution in contraceptive technology – ‘the era of the 
pill began’ – and triggered a shift from “trustful modernity” to rebellion by the late 1960s 
(1980, pp.648). The post-baby boom resumption of declining birth rates was categorically 
different from that of the 1930s. According to Aries, the vast majority of couples did not 
now limit family size in order to move up the social ladder, but instead to free themselves 
from family obligations (1980, pp.648). And the availability of advanced contraceptive 
technology alone could not explain its wide acceptability and uptake.
Aries rejected alternative explanations and believed that the refusal to have an undesired 
child (by resorting to abortion) was a critical new phenomenon. It reflected the end of the 
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“child-king” days, the child was no longer essential in couples’ plans; instead a child was 
just one of the components that might allow adults to blossom as individuals (pp.649). The 
couple and their relationship was now “king” and might make room for a child.
The proponents of SDT coined this the transition from the “king-child with parents” to a 
“king-couple with child” (van de Kaa 1987, pp. 11; van de Kaa 2002, pp.5;). The 
justification of the SDT as a distinct transition rests heavily on this historical interpretation. 
Since the SDT is not solely about changes in birth rates, its proponents incorporated other 
theories of social change in their explanatory framework. Lesthaeghe (1995) argued that the 
SDT reflects and builds on not just Aries’ motivational shift theory, but several other 
irreversible revolutions in the Western world: the sexual revolutions proposed by Shorter 
(1971), Westoff’s (1977) contraceptive revolution, as well as Sauvy’s (1960) 
characterization of the first transition as altruistic (and the second as individualistic). The 
shift to “king couple” or the rising importance of the adult dyad led to an increase in the 
minimal standards of union/marriage quality (Lesthaeghe 1995).
The Maslowian drift and rise of individualism—Inglehart’s claims of a shift from 
materialist to post-materialist values also played a critical role in the elaboration of the SDT 
(van de Kaa 1987; Lesthaeghe 1995; Lesthaeghe 2010). This value shift embodies the 
“Maslowian drift” that both proponents place at the heart of the second demographic 
transition – a shift toward higher-order needs of self-actualization and individual autonomy 
to motivate behavior once more basic needs like survival and safety have been satisfied 
(Lesthaeghe 1995). The demographic changes since 1960 cannot be divorced from 
Inglehart’s (1990) ‘silent revolution’ that is argued to have taken place in Western nations as 
a result of the post-war economic affluence and security (Lesthaeghe 1995; 2011). In recent 
statement of the theory, Lesthaeghe (2010, pp.216) linked the Maslowian drift with a set of 
other transitions, the contraceptive revolution, the sexual revolution and the gender 
revolution, all fitting within a framework of rejection of authority and overhaul of normative 
structures.
Pushback against economic explanations—This SDT ideational reorientation 
occurred during peak years of economic growth. Both SDT proponents (van de Kaa 1987, 
1994; Lesthaeghe 1995; Lesthaeghe 2014) acknowledge that SDT does not negate economic 
explanations of family change, such as those offered by Becker (1973, 1974, 1991) and 
Easterlin (1973, 1976). They acknowledged that the shifts in the quality-quantity tradeoff 
with respect to children as a useful concept in explaining the first demographic transition. 
Moreover, they credit rising female labor force participation as having an important role in 
the SDT. However, the economic models for fertility change allow for the reversal of trends 
experienced in the post-War period, and this is where the economic theories are at odds with 
one of the central tenants for the SDT – the irreversibility of changes in family and fertility 
(weakening of traditional family systems and below replacement fertility) (Lesthaeghe 1995, 
Lesthaeghe (2010, pp.). In the language of classical economics, tastes and preferences have 
irreversibly changed.
SDT treats ideational change primarily “as exogenous influences that add stability to trends 
over and beyond economic fluctuations” (Lesthaeghe 2014, pp. 18113). So Lesthaeghe 
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(1995, 2010) emphasizes, that although compatible, the economic models are incomplete 
without the cultural/ideational explanations that SDT theory offers. He uses the strong 
empirical link between cohabitation and secularization to highlight this point, arguing that 
this link cannot be accounted for by Becker’s structural economic theory or Easterlin’s 
theory of labor market conditions (Lesthaeghe 1995). Secularization is a manifestation of 
individual autonomy. Economic theories are incomplete without the Maslowian shift to 
higher order needs.
In summary, for the SDT, ideational change, as seen through the increase in individual 
autonomy, secularization, female emancipation, and post-materialism, is the central 
explanation, without which all other explanations are incomplete.
D. Expanding the SDT substantive and geographic scope
Initially the SDT was proposed as an explanation for below-replacement fertility and union 
formation changes in Europe. Early on the theory’s scope expanded to include mortality and 
migration patterns, but fertility/family change remained the primary focus. Specifically, 
SDT’s proponents (van de Kaa 1994, 1999) incorporated mortality and migration in a 
discussion of the unexpected and dramatic improvements in life expectancy (at birth as well 
as at advanced ages), and the initiation of guest worker schemes in Western European 
countries. Both van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe have argued that the role of migration changed. 
In the first transition (DT) emigration acted as a safety valve in maintaining equilibrium; in 
the second transition (SDT) immigration played a key role in maintaining national-level 
demographic homeostasis. “Replacement migration” is to the second demographic transition 
what replacement fertility was to the first transition (Lesthaeghe 2010, 2014). These changes 
in migration patterns contributed to an important divide in Europe’s population development 
halfway through the 20th century (van de Kaa 2002).
On the other hand, changes in mortality during the second transition (SDT) were not 
uniquely different from those that took place during the first transition. That it is to say that 
life expectancy continued to improve throughout the two transitions. However, according to 
SDT proponents, similar to fertility, mortality changes in the second transition were, and 
continue to be, strongly influenced by ideational and normative changes. That is, individuals 
took on greater responsibility for their health and adopted preventive measures that reflect 
value systems stressing self-fulfillment and individual freedom (van de Kaa 2002 pp.22, 
2004 pp.6). These SDT insights into the causes of migration and mortality change have not 
had the impact of those focusing on family and fertility.
The geographic scope of SDT has also expanded. Lesthaeghe (1995) aggressively extended 
the geographic reach of the SDT theory to all OECD countries (Lesthaeghe 1995). SDT 
went from explaining changes in Europe to changes in industrialized nations more broadly, 
which meant the addition of the US, Canada, and Australia, New Zealand and Japan. In his 
more recent work Lesthaeghe (2010) claims that the SDT may have explanatory value for 
understanding worldwide family and fertility changes, given that the countries under 
consideration are “wealthy enough to have undergone the Maslowian drift” (pp. 234). 
Several East Asian countries, which have industrialized and urbanized, qualify for being 
considered as a testing ground for the SDT. But Lesthaeghe (2010) cautions that even in 
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countries that meet this criteria, additional features are required for the identification of the 
SDT: below replacement fertility is linked to postponement; rising age at marriage 
conditional on female autonomy and partner choice; rise in prevalence and acceptance of 
premarital cohabitation; a link between demographic change and value orientation (pp234). 
He accounts for the fact that not all four of these features were present in all European 
countries before they entered the SDT by stating that the demographic characteristics of the 
SDT do not have to occur simultaneously but instead are likely to be lagged (2010, pp.234).
We should note, that the more recent works of van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe have diverged 
somewhat. Works by van de Kaa do not typically refer to the SDT as a theory or even a 
theoretical framework. Only a few years after his original piece on the SDT (van de Kaa 
1987), van de Kaa (1994) broadened the historical description to include two other 
dimensions of the social system in addition to culture/ideational change – structure and 
technology. Later he proposed treating the ideational change framework of the SDT as an 
anchored narrative or social history, with sub-narratives where necessary to explain 
variations (van de Kaa 1996). He does, however, still support the validity of the SDT as a 
new demographic regime or “revolution” (van de Kaa 2010, pp.5).
Lesthaeghe’s work on the other hand has often used the term “SDT theory” or theoretical 
framework (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2008; Lesthaeghe 2010, 2011, 2014). He is also much 
more vested in the ideational change explanation, with much of his work focusing on the 
contribution of the ideational change theory to understanding post WWII demographic 
change (Lesthaeghe 1998), and establishing the links between the spread of post-materialist 
values and that change (Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Much of the following discussion in 
this review focuses on Lesthaeghe’s highly visible and expansive use of the SDT, as opposed 
to van de Kaa’s historical and more circumscribed descriptive work.
III. EMPIRICAL ADEQUACY OF THE SDT
Lesthaeghe (e.g., 2010) has elaborated the SDT in response to emerging and (according to 
the SDT) unexpected demographic realities. This is an expected step in “the wheel of 
science” (or paradigmatic science) that re-establishes an acceptable fit between data and 
theory. Below we describe the fit of SDT predictions with observed changes, and we note 
elaborations of SDT (if any) to this evidence.
A. Union and family formation
Changes in union formation are at the heart of the second demographic transition. The SDT-
related value changes are predicted to cause: mean age at marriage to increase, first marriage 
rates to decline, divorce rates to rise, cohabitation to become increasingly common and 
accepted, and the proportion of non-marital births to increase.
Broadly speaking, recent change in union formation are consistent with SDT expectations 
(see Cherlin 2012: 585–586) as well as with what Cherlin (2004) called the 
“deinstitutionalization of marriage”. Age at marriage has increased worldwide (Ortega 
2014); Asian countries like Japan, Korea and Taiwan are now some of the latest-marrying 
countries in the world (Raymo et al 2015) and even African nations are experiencing a rapid 
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increase in age at marriage (Shapiro and Gebreselassie 2014). Further, there is no Western 
country where the proportions never-marrying have not increased from their levels in the 
early 20th century (van de Kaa 2002; Cherlin 2014). The decline in rates of first marriage 
rates has been even more dramatic in East Asian countries with economic growth matching 
Western nations, although variations by socioeconomic class remain (Raymo et al 2015). In 
China age at marriage increased dramatically in the 1970s, but, has experienced relatively 
little marriage change (albeit in the expected direction) since. Marriage remains nearly 
universal and within a narrow age range (Raymo et al 2015).
But when one looks more closely at the data questions arise. First, although marriage rates 
did decline in most industrialized countries after the middle of the 20th century, these trends 
show a modest reversal in the vanguard nations of the SDT (Sweden and Denmark) as early 
as the 1990s (van de Kaa 1994). Second, the mean age at marriage in low and middle-
income countries is currently reaching the level that wealthier countries had reached in the 
1970s (Cherlin 2014), with several countries in Africa experiencing age at marriage nearly 
as high as that in contemporary Europe. Perhaps postmodern values are diffusing to new 
settings spawning an earlier start of the SDT (Lesthaeghe 2010: 244–45), in a way 
analogous to what Thornton calls “developmental idealism” (2001). Or more likely, high/
rising ages at marriage are a response to greater economic crises and uncertainty (Shapiro 
and Gebreselassie 2014) or women’s dissatisfaction with the conflicts of rapidly changing 
economic participation and persistent traditional gender roles (Frejka et al 2010; Jones and 
Yeung 2014).
The proponents of SDT claim that the weakening of the institution of marriage is one of the 
main characteristics of the SDT. This is seen through trends in both divorce and remarriage – 
with the SDT predicting that divorce rates increase and remarriage rates decrease. 
Demographic data show that, despite cross-national differences, divorce rates increased for 
almost all industrialized countries during the 1980s and 1990s (van de Kaa 2002). However, 
in the last two decades some of these countries have experienced greater marital stability. 
Data for OECD countries shows that although all countries have experienced an increase in 
divorce from 1975 levels, half of the OECD countries saw a decline in divorce rates from 
1995 (OECD 2015). The East Asian nations have recently experienced an increase in 
divorce rates (Raymo et al 2015). However, similar to the US (Cherlin 2010), divorce shows 
a strong negative educational gradient in East Asia (Raymo et al 2015), once again 
suggesting that the variation may have more to do with structural factors, like poverty, than 
increases in individualism or self-actualization. Moreover, in East Asia as well as in 
countries like the U.S., marriage remains a valued institution, with most young adults 
expressing the desire to marry at some point in the future (Thornton and Young-DeMarco 
2001; Manning et al 2007; Smock and Greenland 2010; Raymo et al 2015).
Increases in cohabitation predicted by the SDT are also widely observed. Several studies 
have documented the increase in both acceptability and prevalence of cohabitation across 
most industrialized nations. There are however sharp differences in cohabitation rates across 
countries. Even in Europe, the prevalence of cohabitation ranges from more than 75 percent 
in France and Finland to less than 10 percent in Italy and Poland (Heuveline and Timberlake 
2004). Cohabitation in the U.S. has increased among all social classes, however, duration 
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remains shorter than in most other Western societies, and large proportion of these unions 
end in marriage (Cherlin 2010). Moreover, in many places where cohabitation is common it 
continues to function as a precursor for marriage, rather than a substitute. In the U.S. 
couple’s often “slide” into a cohabiting union, rather than consciously choosing it as an 
alternative for marriage or as a rejection of authority or traditional norms (Raley 2001; 
Manning and Smock 2005). Heuveline and Timberlake’s analysis (2004) shows that even 
among SDT leaders like Sweden close to two-thirds of cohabitations end in marriage.
Further, despite high levels of economic and social development and some of the lowest 
fertility rates, Asian countries such as Japan and South Korea have only recently started 
experiencing an increase in cohabitation, and it functions primarily as a precursor to 
marriage rather than an alternative (Raymo et al 2009; Raymo et al 2015). Recent studies 
show that Latin America is experiencing a cohabitation boom (Esteve et al 2012), although 
earlier studies analyzing similar data found early and persistent marriage in the region 
(Fussell and Palloni 2004).
A final expected change in union formation by the SDT is the separation of fertility and 
marriage. Here there is great variability across and within developed countries (Hiekel and 
Castro-Martin 2014; Hayford et al 2014). Non-marital fertility in the U.S. increased 
dramatically over the last 50 years, however, it is strongly correlated with poverty and low-
education, pointing towards structural explanations more than cultural explanations of 
ideational change motivating behavior (Bailey et al 2013; Cherlin 2010; Gibson-Davis et al 
2005). Scholars find similar patterns for Russia as well (Perelli-Harris and Gerber 2011). 
Non-marital fertility remains very low in many parts of Southern Europe and is rare even in 
the Asian countries said to be experiencing the second demographic transition (Ravaneral et 
al 1999; Jones 2007; Raymo et al 2015).
B. Sub-replacement fertility
The second main SDT prediction is that below replacement fertility (via marked degree of 
postponement and definitive childlessness) will become a permanent feature in countries 
where material needs have been satisfied and the Maslowian drift has occurred (Lesthaeghe 
2010). Several studies find an increase in both attitudes and experiences of childlessness, not 
just in the West but Latin America as well (Rowland 2007; Rosero-Bixby et al 2009; Merz 
and Liefbroer 2012).
A large literature on the phenomenon of low and lowest-low fertility has also emerged (e.g., 
Goldstein et al 2009; Morgan and Taylor 2006; Sobotka 2004; Kohler et al 2002; Morgan 
2003; Frejka and Calot 2001; Foster 2000). At the end of the 20th century, fertility rates in 
the western world varied substantially; some countries had fertility near replacement levels 
(TFR=2.0) and some at much lower levels (TFR<1.5). In fact, there was evidence of a 
recovery in fertility rates for several countries, many of whom were cited as leaders of the 
SDT (e.g., Scandinavian countries, France). Whereas fertility rates for Eastern and Southern 
European countries, who had begun their second transition later, had fertility rates below 1.5 
(Sobotka 2008). Fertility rates for the Asian countries, that had experienced few of the 
family formation shifts characteristic of the SDT, also remained well below 2 births (Atoh et 
al 2004).
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In sum, economically developed countries have sorted themselves into two groups: one 
approximating replacement level fertility (TFRs 1.8–2.1) and another with TFR’s of 1.5 and 
below (see Rindfuss and Choe 2015). The SDT did not anticipate this diversity initially. The 
proponents argue that while the SDT was a good predictor of postponement, it did not 
predict the variations in fertility rates or the divergence in recuperation rates (Lesthaeghe 
2010). They later distinguish between SDT aspects related to self-actualization and 
emancipation to account for recuperation differentials (Lesthaeghe 2010, 2011).
C. Links with ideational change
While some studies find links between post-materialism and postponement of marriage and 
nontraditional family norms and attitudes more broadly (e.g., Bystrov 2014; Gubernskaya 
2010), the SDT’s posited link between ideational change (postmodernist values) and fertility 
decline does not find consistent empirical support, even in the regional heart of the SDT – 
North Western Europe. Contrary to original SDT predictions, van de Kaa (2001) found 
Inglehart’s postmaterialist values to be positively correlated with total fertility rates for a 
sample of European countries. Lesthaeghe (2010, 2011, 2014) has also acknowledged that 
the SDT theory affects components of fertility in opposite directions – some fostering 
postponement and thus lowering fertility, others fostering recuperation. Another study by 
Lesthaeghe and Lopez (2013) found that cohabitation and non-conventional family 
formation more closely mirror the “history of secularization”, whereas fertility 
postponement is more closely linked to structural factors like female education and 
employment.
Surkyn and Lesthaeghe (2004) used large-scale, cross-sectional data from the 1999–2000 
European Values Survey for two Iberian, three Western European, and two Scandinavian 
countries and interpreted their results as supporting the ideational change hypothesis of SDT. 
Specifically, they show that “non-conformist orientation” is strongly linked with household 
type in all three regions. Married couples who never cohabited and cohabiting couples with 
children were at two ends of the conformist-orientation spectrum. On the other hand, Van de 
Kaa’s (2001) analysis of the World Values Survey data from the 1990s found no correlation 
between the proportion of extramarital births and postmodern or postmaterialist values, 
leading him to speculate that this might be explained by preexisting differences in the 
acceptability of childbearing outside marriage across European societies.
D. Empirical fit: an appraisal
Lesthaeghe (2014) maintains that the 1980s version of the SDT was correct in predicting a 
shift in value orientations, the spread of different partnership formation patterns, and sub-
replacement fertility. Yet, it is hard to find a consistent pattern across countries, beyond 
perhaps the spread of cohabitation. Several studies show that even within Europe there is 
growing evidence of divergence rather than convergence between countries (Billari and 
Wilson 2001; Billari and Liefbroer 2010). Of special importance is the failure of SDT to 
predict or account for the variation in low fertility. In some countries fertility continues to 
fall, and it is recuperating in others. Further, some countries leading the fertility decline, 
such as Japan, are lagging behind in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing rates. While 
countries that were late to transition, like those in Southern Europe and some in East Asia, 
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now have some of the lowest fertility rates but have seen slow increase in cohabitation, 
divorce and non-marital fertility (Ravaneral 1999; Dominguez-Folgueras and Castro-Martin 
2013). The vanguards of the SDT, countries like Sweden with high postmaterialist and 
secular values, have started to experience recuperation in fertility rates.
Second, the SDT does a poor job accounting for within country variation. The SDT views 
these differential as a “cultural lag” as opposed to persistent differences linked to persistent 
inequality or identity differences, a point we return to in the critique below (also see Cherlin 
2016). Finally, and of critical importance, the SDT’s posited link between ideational change 
(postmodernist values) and fertility/family change does not find consistent empirical 
support.
IV. CRITIQUES
The SDT has been challenged. We review a set of criticisms aimed at SDT and offer some 
additional ones. We then focus on two important forces, gender change and globalization, 
largely ignored in SDT.
A. Criticisms of SDT
We note above that the SDT predictions comport with some major features of recent family 
and fertility change. This is expected since the SDT was constructed to account for these 
facts. Further, as expected subsequent SDT statements are elaborated to account for “new 
facts” not predicted. But a key criticism related to “theory fit” takes aim at the heart of SDT 
– the Aries/Inglehart claim of the watershed changes in ideology that undergird the SDT – a 
shift from “materialism/post-materialism” (or the related “child-king” to “king couple”). 
This undergirding mechanism is problematic (Coleman 2004, pp19) because consistent 
empirical evidence is lacking (see section above, e.g., Raymo et.al. 2015). Further, Coleman 
(2004, pp14–15) points out that a transition “should be complete and irreversible… (and) … 
shared by most individuals in a population”. It is a change “between one long term 
sustainable demographic pattern and another”. Coleman challenges the view that all aspects 
of the SDT are new (see also Cliquet 1991; Bailey et al 2013; Van Bavel and Reher 2013) 
and questions whether the changes we observe are complete and irreversible. Coleman raises 
these issues citing empirical patterns that do not conform to the SDT (as we do for some 
trends above).
But we raise a more fundamental criticism: this search for developmental stages and 
irreversible transitions is wrongheaded. Such developmental theories generally fall victim to 
three interrelated problems: reliance on cross-sectional data, an expectation of common 
processes and patterns of change, and the description of the “end state” as the most 
developed western society. Thornton’s (2001; 2005) critique of developmental theories (of 
the family) and “reading history sideways” apply (see 2005 pp.104–107). Note that the 
original SDT statements were clearly an exercise in examining cross-sectional data and 
interpreting differences observed as if they represented longitudinal change, i.e., reading 
history sideways (see Thornton’s [2005 pp. 116–17] discussion of Inglehart’s work that is a 
foundation of the SDT). The SDT places countries into groups of ‘leaders’ and ‘laggards’ 
depending on how far along they are in a predetermined set of stages (e.g., Lesthaeghe 
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1995). And the end state of the development process is best exemplified by the country most 
accepting of postmodern values.
Let us be specific about the negative consequence of each problem. First, interpreting cross-
sectional data as representing longitudinal change requires strong assumptions that should be 
the focus of inquiry. Rather than looking at context-specific histories, the SDT relies heavily 
on widely available cross-sectional data showing national-level demographic indicators. If 
one assumes a uniform pattern of societal change, then these cross-sectional data can be 
used to construct the “stages” of the SDT (see Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004). Even as early 
as 1993, van de Kaa recognized that it was problematic to force “a multi-dimensional reality 
into a linear, sequential framework” (van de Kaa 1994). However, this did not lead to 
significant revisions of the SDT.
Second, assuming similar processes and patterns of social change is almost always 
empirically inaccurate. Developmental theories posit a universal explanation for 
demographic patterns across times, places, and cultures (for critiques see Johnson-Hanks 
2008; Riley and McCarthy 2003; Rivkin-Fish 2003). The SDT sees postmodern values as a 
powerful “exogenous” force with consistent effects worldwide. This search for a universal 
explanation assumes that changes in the meanings and practices surrounding reproduction 
and family formation occur in patterns shared across cultures. Changes in demographic rates 
are seen as indicators of progress in the universal transition toward modernization (now 
postmodernism) (Rivkin-Fish 2003). However, an immense literature reveals that the 
assumptions of modernization stages are historically naïve (e.g., Handwerker, 1986; 
Thornton 2001; McCann 2009). As a specific example, Lesthaeghe and Neidert (2006) make 
the case that U.S family patterns are a “textbook example” of (and not an exception to) the 
SDT. They acknowledge that the SDT is less visible/powerful in the “Midwest, the Great 
Plains, and the South”. They attribute this to lower levels of education and less 
secularization in these areas and suggest that SDT changes will come to these areas soon (p. 
694). But these regional patterns are now etched into the U.S. political/cultural divide (the 
Red vs. Blue phenomenon) and show no signs of wear (see Morgan 2011; 2015). Is it useful 
to view these 21st century U.S. regional differences as backwardness and as a temporary 
phenomenon?
And third, assumptions about the order of transitions and the end state are frequently driven 
by ethnocentric biases, as opposed to sound theory (McCann 2009). We fear that the SDT 
reinforces and furthers fundamentally ethnocentric interpretations. We know that the SDT 
was based upon White-European family experience and that its most advanced form is 
posited to be emerging in western populations most accepting of postmodern values (e.g., 
Nordic countries). Examples of this can be seen in the exclusion of “the ethnic component” 
from national fertility and family indicators when searching for empirical evidence of the 
SDT (Lesthaeghe 2010, pp. 216), or as stated above, in making regional exceptions to create 
“textbook examples” (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006). This exercise assigns value judgements 
to difference. Is it true that all people value what white Europeans do?
In sum, reading history sideways does not, in and of itself, refute the SDT theory; it only 
indicates that the empirical underpinnings are weak. But in theory construction, van de Kaa 
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and Lesthaeghe chose the kind of broad, ethnocentric explanations that have attracted many 
sociologists and demographers in the past – grand theories of sequential, developmental 
change driven by a single powerful force inexorably leading to an end stage. This end stage 
is approximated by the current patterns in countries seen as “most advanced”.
B. Gender systems given the short shrift
Bernhardt (2004) has argued that inattention to gender is one of the main shortcomings of 
the SDT (also see Arpino 2014; García-Manglano et al 2014; McDonald 2000; Solsona 
1998). She points out that individual autonomy and self-actualization are not gender-neutral 
concepts; they hold different meanings and implications for men and women. Thus, the 
consequences of women’s increasing self-actualization and individualism are more 
consequential for family change than men’s shifts to higher-order preferences (Bernhardt 
2004; see Solsona 1998 for a substantive example).
While SDT largely understates the role of gender change, competing theories have assigned 
it a pivotal role in explanatory models of fertility and family change (Goldscheider et al 
2015; Esping-Anderson and Billari 2014; Mason 2001; McDonald 2000; Chenais 1996). For 
instance, McDonald (2000) distinguished between gender equity in family-oriented and 
individual-oriented institutions, a distinction crucial for understanding not just the transition 
from high to low fertility but also the decline to lowest-low fertility. In line with 
Lesthaeghe’s argument that the first transition involved changes in the private sphere, 
McDonald (2000) asserts that that the shift from high to low fertility is primarily due to slow 
improvements in gender equity within family-oriented institutions followed by rapid 
increases in gender equity in individual-oriented institutions like the education and labor 
market systems, particularly in Western nations. However, the rapid increase or ‘revolution’ 
in the individual-oriented institutions, without complimentary and continued shifts in the 
family institutions leads to very low fertility. Goldscheider (2000) makes a similar argument 
for family formation patterns; much of the decline in marriage, as seen by increases in both 
divorce and cohabitation, can be attributed to the gender asymmetry in responsibilities 
(equal share of economic tasks but unequal share of domestic tasks).
Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) offer another framework centered on gender-equity 
regimes. They suggest a longer-term developmental perspective when trying to understand 
fertility change, and argue that recent changes are an extension of the (first) demographic 
transition: following the DT first three stages (i. high vital rates, ii. declining fertility and a 
slower fertility decline and iii, low vital rates), countries will experience below replacement 
fertility in phase iv and will show recuperation from very low fertility in phase v. The shift 
from phase iv to v is explained by the “gender equity catch-up” (pp.394). In this framework 
persistently low fertility is explained by the lag in public and private gender equity (work-
family conflicts), and recuperation occurs because of what they call a “gender-equity 
dividend” – a relative scarcity of marriageable women relative to men that facilitate greater 
gender equity (pp.393).
As a final example, Goldscheider et. al (2015) explicitly offers a gender framework as an 
SDT competitor. Their approach predicts the recuperation of fertility to replacement levels 
and greater union stability. The gist of the argument is that there are “two halves” of the 
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gender revolution. “Structural changes” in women’s roles in the public sphere 
(employment), i.e., in the first half of the gender revolution, have disrupted traditional 
gender relationships producing the “negative trends in fertility and union stability identified 
by the SDT” (Goldscheider 2015, pp. 229). The second half of the gender revolution, a 
change that is at best partial in many countries, involves changes in men’s roles. These 
changes, viewed as inevitable by Goldscheider et.al will produce a more equitable division 
of parenting and household labor. These changes in turn will increase fertility and union 
stability (see Miettinen et al 2011 for an empirical example).
These gender-based correctives have their own problems. For one, they beg the question: 
what causes gender change? Second, they assume that all women are able to find men with 
egalitarian views and substantial earning-potential, the likelihood of which is higher among 
the more educated group/class (Cherlin 2016). It is problematic to replace one unilinear/
convergence explanation with another.
C. The import of globalization
Mills and Blossfeld (2013) argue that globalization has critical implications for 
understanding recent decades of family and fertility change and that the SDT has ignored 
this powerful set of forces (see also Esping-Anderson 1999). Globalization theory (Blossfeld 
et al 2005) offers a structural explanation based on four pillars: the declining importance of 
national borders for economic transactions; accelerated global interconnectedness through 
the IT revolution; tougher tax competition between countries accompanied by deregulation 
and privatization; and the exposure to an increasingly volatile global market. These four 
shifts, experienced across the globe, have led to high levels of life course uncertainty, 
including economic, temporal, and employment-related uncertainties. For instance, the 
young adult population is increasingly vulnerable to labor market uncertainty, which has 
contributed to postponement of life transitions, including entry into partnerships and 
parenthood.
One of the key factors distinguishing globalization theory from SDT theory is the 
importance it attributes to the role of domestic path-dependent institutions in filtering 
uncertainty, often unequally across different social groups. The major institutions at play 
include the nation’s welfare regime, employment system, and education system. Cross-
national differences in family patterns and fertility levels are accounted for by differences in 
these three institutions. Countries with social-democratic regimes (e.g., Sweden) make the 
transition to partnership and parenthood easier than conservative welfare systems (e.g. 
Germany) relying on male breadwinner model. When men in these latter societies face labor 
market uncertainty, they are likely to postpone family transitions. Similarly, countries with 
open employment systems are able to mitigate and distribute uncertainty differently from 
those with closed employment systems. Educational systems differ in the amount of time 
spent in schools, the relative importance given to qualification versus ability-based learning, 
standardization, and links to labor market entry. These factors in turn influence the degree to 
which young people face uncertainty. The forces of globalization exacerbate inequality by 
offering more opportunities to better-educated youth.
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Inequality is a central tenet of the globalization framework, whereas the SDT is relatively 
silent on this topic. The SDT silence on inequality and it emphasis on ideology suggest that 
all individuals have the agency and power to exercise individual freedom, achieve self-
actualization and shape their life course. Under the globalization framework, institutional 
incompatibility of combining work and family, particularly in the context of labor market 
uncertainty is the driving force behind changes in family and fertility. The globalization 
framework does not imply unilinear change or country level convergences in fertility and 
family patterns (like SDT and some other frameworks discussed above), rather it provides 
for path dependence produced by the interaction of globalization forces and country-specific 
institutions.
D. Critical appraisal
Above we have argued that the underlying mechanism producing the SDT (a shift to 
postmodern values) is not reliably present prior to expected changes (in family and fertility). 
But more fundamentally, we challenge the search for all-powerful exogenous forces that 
produce predictable stages in the unilinear movement toward an “end stage”. This end stage 
resembles the contemporary country with the widest acceptance of postmodern values. Van 
de Kaa (1994) and later Lesthaeghe (2010) do admit that the SDT’s proposed sequence of 
changes in family and fertility and the inter-connectedness between key components was 
overly rigid. In fact, Lesthaeghe recently stated that the SDT should not be taken as a 
“teleological grand script with a standard scenario” but rather as a “general narrative that 
leaves room for many sub-narratives” (Lesthaeghe 2010, pp.225). While this suggestion 
seems to resolve the “fit to data”, it begs the question “what is left” of the original theory? 
And what are the mechanisms and processes that drive this attenuated SDT?
We have also reviewed SDT critiques that have argued for the incorporation of gender 
change and globalization into the SDT. Moreover, Lesthaeghe (2014) and van de Kaa (2004) 
are also on record acknowledging that the forces of globalization and gender are at play. 
While gender change and globalization are powerful forces that must be part of any 
compelling explanation of recent family/fertility change, we will not make great strides 
forward by rejecting the SDT in favor of a theory privileging gender or globalization. Mills 
and Blossfeld (2013) recognize the limits of their globalization approach and suggest that 
integrating the SDT and globalization frameworks “offers a more coherent perspective to 
understand changes in family formation since the late 1960s” (pp. 29). This is a promising 
direction, but the path forward is not specified. How will these approaches be integrated?
What is needed is a theory with mechanisms that can incorporate the import of new ideas as 
well as the material conditions of life, a theory that acknowledges the “duality of structure” 
(Sewell 1992; 2005). The family and fertility regime that SDT predicts is a social structure 
produced by the simultaneous and inseparable impact of ideas (schemas or frames in 
people’s brains and in the world) and materials (in the world) that promote or constrain 
particular behaviors. This multi-level, interactive process would produce commonly 
observed path dependence, i.e., variation in the rate and nature of social change. One effort 
in this direction is the Theory of Conjunctural Action (TCA); it adopts this duality of 
structure approach and applies it to family change and variation (Johnson-Hanks et al 2011). 
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TCA emerged from a consilience project that engaged many scientists; it provides an 
innovative framework that incorporates causal factors/processes at multiple levels of 
analysis. The TCA’s core argument is that social and family demographers need to 
conceptualize human behavior as “emerging out of construal, grounded in schemas and 
materials, identity and structure” (pp. 56). These TCA building blocks integrate and make 
inseparable ideational causal forces (including ones central to SDT) and changes in material 
conditions (that lie at the heart of globalization and gender frameworks).
Johnson-Hanks et.al (2011, see Chapters 3, 4 and 5) provide several extended applications of 
this TCA theory of fertility and family change (also see Bachrach and Morgan 2013). But 
the TCA key components are integral to explanations of many phenomena. As a result, 
application of this framework (or one like it) makes social demographic work more relevant 
to work in other substantive domains. Likewise, insights from other domains would be more 
easily grasped by social demographers. The social demographer’s penchant for parsimony, 
at the expense of substantive plausibility, has led to overreliance on theories posing 
inevitable, irreversible, and unilinear change. The second demographic transition is one 
example; theories embracing the “duality of structure” provide flexible alternatives, ones 
that embrace path dependence.
V. CONCLUSION
Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa offered the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) as 
a description of Western European, post-Baby Boom family and fertility patterns, a useful 
descriptive contribution. Key components were below replacement-level fertility and an 
increasing diversity of union types. They posited that attractive new ideas, postmodern ideas/
attitudes, enabled and required these changes, claims that are suspect. Further, Lesthaeghe 
has expanded the geographical scope of SDT greatly in the last two decades. While, the SDT 
has been elaborated in the face of conflicting empirical evidence and criticisms from social 
demographers, it retains fundamental weaknesses -- many shared with other developmental 
theories popular with family sociologists and social demographers. Social demographers 
should explore theory not anchored in “stages” and one that does not posit a unilinear, 
developmental path toward some “end stage” – in the case of SDT, one assumed to look like 
the “advanced” Western country most accepting of postmodern values. Instead, they should 
adopt or develop frameworks that incorporate postmodern values as one of many, interacting 
sources of change.
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Figure 1. 
Citations to the Second Demographic Transition (SDT): Peer-reviewed publications and 
Google Scholar cites
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